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REPUBLICAN FOREIGN POLICY

WILLIAM APPLEMAN WILLIAMS

AMERICA AND RUSSIA

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN

WHAT NEXT IN KOREA?

THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION

THE EDITORS

VOL. 4

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NOTES FROM THE EDITORS

Beginning with the February issue, MR will publish every month an analysis of latest developments in the American labor movement by Arthur Eggleston, Labor columnist for the *San Francisco Chronicle* during the 1930s, Nieman Fellow at Harvard in 1940-41, and most recently labor columnist on the late *New York Compass*, Eggleston is one of the country's leading experts on the labor movement. We are confident that MR readers will join with us in welcoming this new feature. Labor coverage has been one of MR's greatest weaknesses in the past; we hope that from now on it will be just the opposite.

But by committing up to five pages a month to an article on labor we recognize that we are taking a long step on the road to the 48-page issue as the normal size of MR. And that means that we are going to need increased financial support from you, our readers. For precisely this reason, the results to date of this year's drive by Monthly Review Associates have been somewhat disturbing. The first five weeks after MRA's appeal was issued brought in 20 fewer members and \$750 less this year than last. We

(continued on inside back cover)

WHAT NEXT IN KOREA?

It is becoming increasingly clear that the realistic alternatives in Korea are either (1) a spreading of the war, or (2) the establishment of peace as one part of a general settlement in the Far East. A temporary isolation of Korea, which is what a cease-fire would amount to, seems, unfortunately, to be unattainable.

Responsibility for this situation is unquestionably Washington's. The Communists have repeatedly offered to conclude a cease-fire provided the terms are purely military and *all* political issues are deferred for subsequent negotiation. That is the clear meaning of the latest Soviet proposal in the UN for an immediate cease-fire, leaving the repatriation of prisoners to be settled at a later date by an eleven-nation commission.

The prisoner question is in no sense a military question; it is purely political and it raises issues of the greatest importance in an era when international wars are also inevitably civil wars. It follows that the United States government, by insisting on acceptance of the voluntary repatriation principle, is in effect demanding a high political price for a cease-fire. But why should the Communists be expected to pay this price? The local military situation is one of stalemate, and in broad strategic terms it certainly costs the United States more than it does the Chinese to maintain large military forces in Korea. Both sides would, of course, benefit from an end to the fighting, but there is no reason to suppose that either side would gain enough more than the other to induce it to make important political concessions to attain a cease-fire. Since this must be obvious to Washington, we can only conclude that the United States simply does not want a cease-fire at this time.

All this has been obscured by the conflict in the UN over the Indian cease-fire formula. Vishinsky's handling of the Communist case played into Acheson's hands and made it appear that it was the Communists and not the Americans who were refusing a compromise to bring the Korean War to a halt. That this was not in fact the case must be apparent to anyone who examines the issue

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in dispute and reflects on the kind of compromise that would be feasible under existing conditions.

As a matter of principle, the issue is whether all prisoners of war must be repatriated at the end of hostilities. The Communists say yes, the United States says no. Like all principles, this one can of course be stretched or ignored in particular cases, but as a principle it has to be settled one way or the other. That settlement could form a part of a wider compromise, in which a political concession by one side on the prisoner issue was compensated by political concessions on other issues by the other side. But posed by itself it has to be decided either the way the United States wants it or the way the Communists want it. It follows that as long as the prisoner question is the only political issue at stake, a genuine compromise (as distinct from a disguised capitulation by one side or the other) can only take the form of an agreed postponement so that all political issues may be considered together.

Now, from the American point of view the whole dispute over the Indian formula centered around its last sentence (Paragraph 17): "At the end of ninety days [after conclusion of a cease-fire] the disposition of any prisoners of war whose return to their homelands has not been effected in accordance with the procedure set out above shall be referred by the Repatriation Commission [established elsewhere in the Indian resolution] to the political conference to be called under Article 60 of the draft armistice agreement." The State Department immediately and publicly interpreted this to mean precisely what it seems to mean: there shall be a cease-fire now, and the fate of the prisoners who do not want to go home will be decided later. Having absolutely no intention of agreeing to this solution—which, as we have seen, is really the only possible form of compromise at the present time—the United States made it plain that the Indian formula would be acceptable only with specific amendments which would actually turn it into an endorsement of the American position.

What promised to be a first-class row immediately began to develop between the United States on the one hand and the countries (especially Britain and Canada) which were supporting the Indian plan in the hope that it might prove acceptable to the Communists. It was at precisely this point that Vishinsky chose to denounce and reject the Indian formula, thus getting the State Department off the hook and putting an end to the incipient rift in the capitalist camp.

It is hard to avoid the conclusion that this was a tactical blunder. True, Paragraph 3 of the Indian draft, on which Vishinsky centered his fire, instructs the Repatriation Commission to send home only those prisoners who want to go home. But it does not give the com-

mission any power to dispose of the prisoners who do not want to go home; under Paragraph 17, as we have seen, their fate would be up to the post-armistice political conference and hence would have to be considered in conjunction with all the other problems of the Far East. Since there was no doubt that Washington would not agree to this, Vishinsky had only to keep quiet to force the United States to bear the whole onus of rejecting the Indian plan.

The correctness of this analysis was fully demonstrated by subsequent events. Even *after* the Soviet Union had turned the plan down and hence there was no chance of its adoption, Washington insisted on amending Paragraph 17 to provide that if the political conference called after the armistice could not dispose of unrepariated prisoners in thirty days, they should then become the responsibility of the United Nations—in effect a complete acceptance of the American position. The Soviet delegate should have been in a position to point out that this amendment completely deprived the Indian proposal of its compromise character. Instead, he himself had already accepted responsibility for torpedoing the proposal.

The ineptness of Soviet diplomacy in this case cost the Communists what could have been a relatively easy and not unimportant victory in the struggle for public opinion. But it should not be allowed to cover up the real situation: the United States has at no time shown any inclination to compromise on the prisoner question, to treat it as what it is, a political question which should be negotiated along with all the other political questions underlying and resulting from the Korean War.

Why?

James Reston, writing in the *New York Times* of November 23rd, pointed to the answer when he said:

A political settlement with the Communists covering anything beyond an armistice is undoubtedly out of the question. He [Eisenhower] may very well be struggling with the future of Formosa and the "unification" of Korea when he leaves the White House, let alone before he enters it.

In other words, American policy-makers have resolutely set their faces against recognizing the right of the undoubted government of the most populous country on earth to existence and reasonable military security. This being the case, a general political conference following a Korean cease-fire could only serve to divide the United States from its major allies (especially Britain, France, and India) who clearly see the futile and ultimately self-defeating character of American policy. But as long as the Korean War is going on, it is practically impossible for them to disentangle themselves from Amer-

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ican policy and to set a new course in the Far East. It must be remembered that they themselves are co-sponsors of the Korean War, and that to break with the United States while military operations are still continuing would be generally interpreted as a step of the utmost gravity, for which none of the countries in question could be expected to assume responsibility. On the other hand, it would be relatively easy to adopt new policies at a peace conference. Hence Washington, in order to maintain the unity of the anti-Chinese coalition, has no choice but to prolong the Korean War.

Is there perhaps a chance that Eisenhower and his new Secretary of State Dulles will alter this course and adopt a more rational policy toward China? Hardly; an intensification of Washington's anti-Chinese policy is much more likely. It is wise to forget Eisenhower's campaign oratory about ending the Korean War and to concentrate on Dulles' actual Far Eastern record in the last few years. As I. F. Stone has shown in his *Hidden History of the Korean War*, Dulles was one of the chief actors in the events leading to the outbreak of the war (see especially Chapter 4, "The Role of John Foster Dulles"). He was the architect of the profoundly anti-Chinese and anti-Soviet Japanese Peace Treaty. He has repeatedly and publicly espoused the goal of overthrowing the present regime in China. It would be hard to be more explicit on this point than Dulles was in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Japanese Peace Treaty:*

As a long-range proposition . . . it can be said that it is obviously abnormal that Japan should be permanently divorced from the raw materials and the markets which are close at hand. But even accepting that fact we do not need to conclude from it that Japan must eventually become a Communist satellite. There is another assumption, and a sound assumption, and that is that the present situation on the mainland *must be changed*. . . . In other words, we must and can assume that there will be a change from the present China situation which now compels the free nations temporarily to restrict closely their economic relations with the mainland of China. . . . We should assume the impermanence, not the permanence, of the present Moscow-oriented rule of China. . . . It would be, in my opinion, a wrong and a defeatist policy to assume that these conditions which exist in China today are in China forever. I do not be-

* This testimony is well worth reading in its entirety: probably nothing of public record is more revealing of the real character of the new Secretary of State. See "Japanese Peace Treaty and Other Treaties Relating to Security in the Pacific," *Hearings before Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate, 82nd Congress, 2nd Session, Jan. 21, 22, 23, and 25, 1952.*

lieve they are there forever. I think they are going to change. (pp. 12, 28; emphasis added.)

The italicized words show clearly enough that this is not a mere prediction. It is a definite policy recommendation. And now that Dulles is Secretary of State he is in a position to attempt to implement his own recommendation. There is no reason to assume that he will do otherwise—until the utter hopelessness of the attempt has been conclusively demonstrated in practice.

In the meantime, the Eisenhower administration is faced with a difficult dilemma in Korea. A genuine compromise to bring the fighting to an end is out of the question: it would mean wrecking the anti-China coalition. And yet the political situation at home insistently demands that something be done about the heavy, continuing, and, on the face of it, senseless slaughter in Korea. One "way out," which is advocated by Syngman Rhee and apparently by most of the brass in Korea, is to bring in more American guns, planes, and men and attempt to drive the North Koreans and Chinese back to the Yalu. There are very strong reasons, however, for doubting that Eisenhower will plump for so desperate a course. On the purely military side, the offensive called for would probably fail, and the political consequences, far from being favorable to the administration, might well be disastrous. Moreover, from the point of view of America's overall military commitments and political ambitions, it would be stupid to commit greater forces to the strategic blind alley of Korea.

But there is a third course open to Eisenhower, and one would probably be safe in assuming that the real purpose of his celebrated trip to Korea was to explore its possibilities. Eisenhower himself hinted at this course when he said (at Champaign, Illinois, on October 2nd), "If there must be a war there [in Korea], let it be Asians against Asians." Because of the context, this has generally been interpreted to mean that Eisenhower was recommending that South Koreans be trained and equipped to assume responsibility for the Korean War, but it is hard to believe that a man with Eisenhower's military experience and knowledge could take such a proposal seriously. He must know that at bottom the Korean War is a war between the United States and China, and that a substitute for the United States must be vastly stronger than South Korea. And he must know, too, that there is only one possible candidate for the job—Japan.

What the American ruling class thinks of Japan is well expressed in the November *Monthly Letter* of the National City Bank:

The Japanese are a disciplined, patriotic, literate people.

Their military and industrial capacity has been demonstrated.

The country has the potential for forming a strong anti-Communist base in Asia. ("Trends in Japan," p. 128.)

The question is whether that potential can be realized. Mr. Dulles thinks it can be. On this question he told the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations last January:

The mood of the people of Japan, like the mood of other free peoples who are close neighbors of Asian Communism, will, in the long run, largely depend on the attitude and action of the other free nations. If they persevere in positive policies in support of real national independence in Asia, Japan will be a dependable and able coadjutor. (Hearings cited above, p. 12.)

Translated out of the peculiar language which may perhaps best be called freeworldese, this means that Dulles thinks that Japanese imperialism can be put back on its feet, and that it can be induced by bribes and/or threats to spearhead America's counter-revolutionary crusade in Asia.

Whether Dulles is right is another question. And whether, if he is, Japan will have any better luck than the United States has had is still another.

At any rate, it seems that the time is rapidly approaching when at least the first of these questions will be put to the acid test.

THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION

Eisenhower's first batch of top-level appointments shows that his administration is not simply a Big Business administration, it is an administration which directly represents the most monopolized (and also most profitable) sectors of heavy industry.

The Rockefeller interests, which dominate the international oil cartel—by far the greatest international capitalist combine that ever existed—control what are likely to be the chief policy-making positions. John Foster Dulles will be in charge of the State Department, always a "fortress of Standard Oil" and now more important than ever to the Rockefeller empire. Dulles' trusted position in the Rockefeller hierarchy is sufficiently attested by the fact that he resigned the position of Chairman of the Rockefeller Foundation to assume that of Secretary of State. Dulles will be aided and advised in his conduct of foreign affairs by the new Ambassador to London, Winthrop Aldrich, who stands at the very peak of America's aristocracy

of wealth (he "would not look out of place in the House of Lords," said the Anglophile *New York Times* in commenting on his appointment). Aldrich is the son of the late Senator Nelson Aldrich who ran the Senate in the days of Teddy Roosevelt and William Howard Taft when it used to be called the millionaires' club; he is the Chairman of the Chase National Bank, the Rockefeller house-bank, as it were; and he is the brother-in-law of John D. Rockefeller, present chief of the Rockefeller clan. The key position in the Cold War at home goes to Herbert Brownell Jr., who, as Attorney General, will decide who is subversive and who should be prosecuted under the ample powers of repression granted by the Smith Act, the McCarran Act, the Taft-Hartley Act, and doubtless other pieces of legislation already on the statute books or on the way. Brownell is the chief political operator for Thomas Dewey who is himself the chief political operator for the Rockefellers. Finally Eisenhower, who has frequently promised to reform the federal government along "businesslike" lines, has appointed Nelson A. (for Aldrich) Rockefeller, son of John D., as chairman of a commission to consider what can be done in this respect. Nothing may come of this, of course, but on the other hand the job might turn out to be one of great strategic importance.

The DuPont interests are nearly as strongly represented as the Rockefellers. The Secretaryship of Defense which controls not only the armed forces but also the letting of tens of billions of dollars of armament contracts, and which can now be expected to take over the whole atomic energy program, goes to C. E. Wilson, President of General Motors Corporation, the greatest profit-making institution in history. DuPont control over General Motors has always been exercised in such a way as to cement the closest kind of an alliance with the far-flung J. P. Morgan empire. Two other General Motors men are included in Eisenhower's cabinet: Douglas McKay of Oregon, Chevrolet-Cadillac dealer, who as Secretary of the Interior will supervise the parcelling out of natural resources (especially water power and tidelands oil) to needy corporations; and Arthur Summerfield of Michigan, largest Chevrolet dealer in the world, who, if he wants to, can doubtless turn the Post Office Department into a powerful instrument of censorship and repression. (If by any chance he wants to improve the service, he has our best wishes for success, even if he represents the Devil himself.) Before we leave the DuPont representation, it is well to note that the man who may well be Eisenhower's closest personal adviser—potentially the Colonel House or Harry Hopkins of the new administration—is General Lucius D. Clay, former chief of the American occupying forces in

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Germany, Chairman of the Board of Directors of Continental Can (where he rubs shoulders with Junius S. Morgan of J. P. Morgan & Co.), and himself a Director of General Motors.

The most important position in the cabinet after State and Defense, the Secretaryship of the Treasury, will be held by George M. Humphrey, President of the M. A. Hanna Co., which is solidly entrenched in the nation's coal, iron, and steel industries. Hanna owns a controlling interest in the National Steel Company, headed by Ernest Weir, the ferocious foe of unions who has managed to this day to maintain a company union in the company town of Weirton. Humphrey and Weir sit together on no fewer than five boards of directors, and, according to Arthur Krock, it was the recommendation of Weir (along with that of Paul Hoffman, head of the Ford Foundation) that moved Eisenhower to appoint Humphrey to the Treasury. (*New York Times*, November 23.) Altogether, Humphrey holds directorships in more than a score of corporations, mostly operating in the fields of coal mining, iron ore mining, lake shipping, and steel production. Through his directorship of the National City Bank of Cleveland, Humphrey is tied up with the Pickands, Mather interests which control, next to U. S. Steel, the largest ore reserves in the country and have strong minority stockholdings in at least four of the nation's ten largest steel producers. One of Hanna's latest enterprises has been the development of Quebec's huge and so far largely unexploited iron ore deposits, a fact which should put Humphrey right alongside the Rockefellers in a shared concern over the treatment accorded to United States capital by foreign countries.

Boston's leading capitalists, accustomed to playing an important role in Republican administrations, are well represented in Eisenhower's entourage. Henry Cabot Lodge, following in the footsteps of his famous father—who, as Professor Williams shows elsewhere in this issue of MR, was one of the original and most vociferous of American imperialists—is to play an important role in the field of foreign affairs (though, to be sure, the bitterest enemy of the League of Nations might be slightly, though probably only momentarily, surprised to find his son chief of the United States delegation to the United Nations). Needless to say, Lodge speaks for Boston's best, which means, generally, for the First National Bank of Boston. Sinclair Weeks, likewise son of a former Massachusetts Senator (who served as Secretary of War in the Harding administration), comes from the same circles, served his business apprenticeship at the First National, of which he is still a director, is now a prominent New England manufacturer, and through his chairmanship (since

1949) of the Republican National Finance Committee probably has as close ties to as many of the nation's wealthy families as any one in the country. Finally, Sherman Adams, who will hold the important post of Assistant to the President, acquired his present prominence and influence not only through being one of Eisenhower's earliest political supporters but also through two terms of faithful and thoroughly businesslike service as governor of Boston's economic colony of New Hampshire.

Two other of Eisenhower's close associates, one of whom is reportedly the likeliest choice to head up the Budget Bureau, must be mentioned. The probable Director of the Budget Bureau is Joseph M. Dodge, President of the Detroit Bank, one-time head of the American Bankers' Association, and a director of Chrysler Corporation. The special significance of Dodge's influential position lies in the fact that ever since the war he has played a key role in shaping United States policy toward Germany and Japan, and no one is in a better position to help extend and deepen the ties which already exist between American Big Business on the one hand and its counterparts in Germany and Japan on the other. The other Eisenhower adviser is Paul G. Hoffman, former President of the Studebaker Corporation and now Director of the Ford Foundation. Hoffman is said to have turned down a cabinet post—no doubt on the ground that the Director of the Ford Foundation is in a position to do more for American capitalism than a mere member of the cabinet—but he is also reported to have told Eisenhower that he would always be available for emergency duty. Hoffman was one of the leading figures in the growth of the Committee for Economic Development, probably the richest of all Big Business research and propaganda outfits, and for several years he directed the Marshallization of Europe from his post as chief of the ECA.

This leaves a few appointments of lesser importance which were apparently made for special political reasons. Precisely what lies behind the appointment of Stassen as Mutual Security Administrator, potentially a position of strategic importance, is unclear to an outsider. A shameless political opportunist, Stassen of course can be had, but what interests have him now does not appear on the public record. Oveta Culp Hobby, accustomed as wartime head of the Wacs to hobnob with generals and admirals, becomes Federal Security Administrator—this is presumably the reward to the country's women for their role in electing Eisenhower. Ezra Taft Benson's function as Secretary of Agriculture seems to be that of being satisfactory to his distant cousin Robert. Finally, there is Martin Durkin, head of the AFL Plumbers' Union, who will sit in the cabinet as

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Secretary of Labor. The spate of newspaper publicity which followed Durkin's appointment made it clear, if there was ever any doubt on the point, that his role is that of fig leaf on the otherwise stark Big Business nakedness of the Eisenhower administration.

To sum up: One cannot, of course, say that the Eisenhower administration is the first Big Business administration in the history of the country. Far from it. But one can say that never before have the biggest monopolies in the decisive heavy industries been so directly, openly, and extensively represented in the executive branch of the federal government as they will be under Eisenhower.

What this presages in one respect is perfectly clear: for the visible future, the United States government is going to be guided by one overriding principle—the maximization of the profits of the biggest monopolies.

But there is still some doubt about what this implies in terms of specific policies, especially in the foreign field. There has been right along a division of opinion among the monopoly capitalists themselves as to the wisest course in world affairs.

This division has nothing to do with isolationism or interventionism: only insignificant portions of the American ruling class are isolationist in any meaningful sense of the term; the overwhelming majority are perfectly willing to have the United States government intervene anywhere and anytime they think it can get away with it. But there is a real difference of opinion, even among the top capitalists, concerning the *ability* of this country to dominate events in the rest of the world.

There are those who seem to assign no limits to this ability. Their program is, of course, extremely reckless and aggressive; if followed to its logical conclusion it could lead only to the disaster of World War III. On the other hand, there are those who see the power of the United States as being limited by a variety of economic, political, and military factors. Their program is one which calls for expanding as far as possible but at the same time requires the exercise of caution and restraint.

It is interesting and important to note that this division between the more adventurous and the more cautious factions of the ruling class extends right into Eisenhower's new cabinet. The whole Rockefeller crowd, with Dewey and Dulles in the lead, have long been urging a more aggressive foreign policy. On the other hand, two of the most prominent spokesmen for a more cautious approach have been Wilson, and Humphrey's close business associate Ernest Weir.

In a speech on October 10, 1951, Wilson cautioned that we may

"overdo military preparedness and [be] at least partly responsible for precipitating a third world war." Such a war, he added, "even after victory, would leave us with the unsolved problem of how to establish a stable peace." And his final advice was that "the military program must not be expanded beyond the minimum needed to defend the country."

In a pamphlet written earlier the same year, Weir was even more outspoken. He had just returned from a trip to Europe, and he stated flatly that he "did not find a single person who believed that Russia would precipitate a war now or for some years to come—if ever." And on China and Communism, he had this to say:

No matter what claims may be made that our attitude toward China is the result of Chinese aggression in Korea, I think the fact is very evident that if the present situation [early January, 1951] results in extension of the war, it will be due to our refusal to recognize the Chinese government, because it is communistic. In other words, the war would be caused by our intention to eradicate Communism. We certainly must realize that we cannot eliminate Communism by war. On the contrary, I am sure that a third world war would increase Communism, because the war would be so long and drawn out and so disastrous that there would be a greater degree of dissatisfaction among the peoples of all nations than exists today.

Contrast this with Dulles' glib statement, quoted on p. 308 above from his testimony on the Japanese Peace Treaty, that "the present situation on the mainland [of China] must be changed." Of course we do not know that Humphrey agrees with Weir, but if Arthur Krock is right that Weir urged Eisenhower to appoint Humphrey, we are surely entitled to infer that the two men see eye-to-eye on most matters.

Eisenhower's own past statements on foreign policy have consistently aligned him with the aggressive, Rockefeller wing of the Republican Party. We may therefore be pretty sure that Dulles will run the show for some time to come. But the fact that Eisenhower has brought men like Wilson and Humphrey into his cabinet in key positions suggests that he may be hedging his bets and preparing the way for a shift in policy in case the Dulles program fails—as it certainly will.

SAVE THE ROSENBERGS

There is a definite connection between the threat of war and the Rosenberg case. The first task of those who plan war is to

militarize the country and suppress all opposition. That is the purpose of the witch hunt, and the Rosenberg case is the witch hunt in its most extreme form.

If there had been no witch hunt it is unthinkable that Julius and Ethel Rosenberg would have been sentenced to death. They were not found guilty of treason. They were not even charged with aiding an enemy nation. Their alleged crime was espionage—in behalf of the USSR at the height of the wartime alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The enormity of the sentence is made clear by one single fact—*never before in our history have the civilian courts imposed the death penalty in any kind of espionage case.*

If the Rosenbergs are executed, it will be a great victory for the witch-hunters and war-makers. If they are saved, it will be a great victory for peace and sanity. We urge all MR readers to appeal to President Truman for executive clemency. Do it now.

(December 15, 1952)

The justice and uselessness of my complaints left in my mind the seeds of indignation against our foolish civil institutions, whereby the real welfare of the public and true justice are always sacrificed to an apparent order, which is in reality subversive of all order, and of which the only effect is to bestow the sanction of public authority upon the oppression of the weak and the injustice of the strong.

—Rousseau, *Confessions*

No doubt the myth that somebody in this country, Dean Acheson or General Marshall or the State Department or the IPR or Owen Lattimore or somebody, is responsible for China becoming a Communist-ruled country will not down for a long time. For a long time the myth will be held that the Chinese people had nothing to do with it, that 450 million of them were moved as inanimate objects by a handful of people in America. But it is a grotesque myth nevertheless, and some day we shall come to our senses again, as is our wont.

—Nathaniel Peffer in *The New Republic*, August 4, 1952.

REPUBLICAN FOREIGN POLICY FROM McKINLEY TO EISENHOWER

BY WILLIAM APPLEMAN WILLIAMS

Eisenhower opened the door of victory and the Republicans squeezed through to power. Once across the threshold, however, the narrow margin of their formal control of the Congress becomes less significant, for enough Democrats will probably vote with them on critical issues to give the party more authority. In the area of foreign relations this is particularly apt to be true. For Stevenson's candid expression of belief in the possibility of co-existence with the Soviet Union, and his apparent willingness to work consciously toward that goal, isolated him from other Democratic leaders as well as from his Republican opponents. Eisenhower's sharp criticism of Stevenson on this specific question indicated, moreover, a broad difference of approach to the general problems of foreign relations.

For Eisenhower has indicated a clear preference for a policy whose antecedents are Theodore Roosevelt's "Big Stick" and antagonism to Russia, William Howard Taft's "Dollar Diplomacy," and Herbert Hoover's (and Charles Evans Hughes') program of overseas economic expansion, unilateral intervention, and opposition to Soviet Russia—rather than the policy first enunciated by the Anti-Imperialists around the turn of the century and later developed and extended by Republican Senators Robert M. La Follette, William E. Borah, and Hiram Johnson. Eisenhower's basic choice is best revealed in his appointment of John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State. For while Dulles was an ardent spokesman for the principles of conciliation as late as 1939 (when it was the Axis powers that were to be conciliated), today his program of "liberation" and "roll-back" is the natural heir to Theodore Roosevelt's belligerency in the Far East and Latin America. Whether there exist today Republicans of the stature and character of the earlier opponents of such vigorous diplomacy remains undetermined. But in any event, a review of the party's history in foreign affairs since the Presidency of William McKinley may provide a useful guide to developments under Eisenhower and Dulles.

The author's just-published book, *American-Russian Relations 1781-1947*, is reviewed by Professor Frederick L. Schuman in this issue of MR.

I

Contrary to the easy explanation, the United States did not suddenly become a world power the day that Admiral George Dewey smashed the Spanish fleet off Manila. For many years the industrial production indexes had been climbing steadily, as had the indicators of the overseas economic expansion of the United States. These clues had not been ignored by two significant groups—British policy-makers and a small coterie of imperial-minded Americans. Though important in a more general context, London's wooing of Washington (as a check against Germany and Japan) was of secondary moment in the determination of American policy. Far more vital in this respect were those economic giants in the United States who were now ready to sit in at the game of dividing the markets and the sources of supply throughout the world—and a tight circle of Republicans who were eager to take charge of the entire venture.

Though led by Theodore Roosevelt and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, this group was not composed exclusively of politicians. Unsuccessful in commands at sea, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan found these men an appreciative audience for his argument that control of the sea was the key to world ascendancy. Likewise, important educators and missionaries were enthusiastic over the idea of an expanding America. Later, after the basic decisions had been made, and after a notorious newspaper campaign, many citizens of the country joined a stampede for promised glory and a share of what was reputed to be the White Man's Burden. This widespread public interest has led some to argue that Americans went on a weird psychological binge, seeking compensation in empire for their domestic frustrations. While more modern than the old claim that the British Empire "just grew like Topsy," this explanation hardly accounts for the conscious discussions of policy and the careful planning of action that took place among the leaders of the expansionist movement.

Quite aware of the domestic economic pressure for expansion, Lodge and Roosevelt also had a theory to account for it. Not of their own, to be sure, but one provided by their close friend Brooks Adams—younger brother of the more famous Henry Adams, and related by marriage to Lodge himself. According to Brooks Adams, America's economy was about to be gluttoned by its own production; hence the steadily increasing demands for expansion voiced by spokesmen for economic interests. For his part, Adams proposed to make of Asia an economic colony that would absorb the surplus and maintain existing profits. Adams admitted, of course, that such empire-building was not absolutely necessary—other solutions were possible—but he preferred, and counselled, vigorous expansion.

Both Lodge and Roosevelt agreed with the essentials of this program, with which they were familiar by 1895. Adams could not have pleased them more, in fact, when he argued further that businessmen could not be trusted with authority. Rather should militant, enlightened, and imaginative politicians assume direction of the entire plan. Roosevelt and Lodge no doubt made refinements and occasionally suggested variations, but the basic program was never changed. And in the Cuban crisis both men worked ceaselessly—and successfully—from their key positions to promote what Lodge termed the “Large Policy” of overseas expansion and annexation. Though originally he may well have opposed such a policy, President William McKinley offered but little resistance once Roosevelt and Lodge scored their first victories. For McKinley ordered the invasion of the Philippines long before the famous night of prayer that apparently led to his decision to annex the islands.

Opposition to this expansionist policy centered in the Democratic Party. Ex-President Grover Cleveland was sharply critical of what he termed “the fatal un-American idea of imperialism and expansion.” Though he hoped the Large Policy would be no more than a “mere craze,” Cleveland shelved his differences with William Jennings Bryan and helped lead the anti-imperialist movement. The steel magnate, Andrew Carnegie, whose opposition to Bryan in the presidential election of 1896 had been bitter, also offered “the hand of friendship” (and financial support) to Bryan and the Anti-Imperialist League; and other Republicans also broke with their party and opposed the policy of annexation adopted by McKinley.

Regular Republicans who joined the Anti-Imperialists were men whose party history went back to the days of Abraham Lincoln—and the days of anti-slavery agitation, which offered a sound heritage for opponents of colonialism. Among these old-line Republicans was Senator William Bayard Hale, who had warned of the “aggressive spirit” as early as 1892. Many other Americans, whose stalwart Republicanism periodically wavered, but whose fundamental loyalty to that party remained intact, agreed with Carl Schurz, leader of the independents. “I believe,” he concluded, “that this democracy, the government of, by, and for the people, is not fitted for a colonial policy, which means conquest by force.” Yet no hard core of political or economic strength could be organized in support of this and similar judgments. Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation of Labor, did oppose annexation of the Philippines; but his view was not shared by many other labor leaders, and the labor movement offered little assistance. Bryan’s efforts to inject the issue into the election of 1900 proved a failure, and within five years anti-imperialist agitation ceased to be significant.

Organized opposition to expansion continued to be meager and politically unimportant from 1900 through 1917. Several factors probably account for this failure of a broader anti-expansionist movement to form and gain strength. Rising progressive leaders were forced, of necessity, to concentrate most of their attention on the many domestic problems of that period. This, in turn, made it easy for both Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson to continue the process of centralizing control of foreign affairs in the office of the president. For the time, moreover, anti-expansionists failed to realize that colonialism was being replaced by a less obvious—and more effective—technique of empire-building: that of overseas economic expansion. Only slowly did progressive Republicans begin to see a relationship between international economics and international politics.

And when they did, their position was challenged by a new argument. Criticisms of "Dollar Diplomacy" were answered with the claim that domestic prosperity was built on foreign economic expansion; and the progressives were unable to offer a coherent economic policy to put in its place. Later, opposition to existing foreign policies was still further weakened because America's entry into World War I exposed such men as Senator Robert M. La Follette to the charge of disloyalty. It is not surprising, therefore, that though some of the progressive Republicans sought to follow through on the policies of the Anti-Imperialist League, their attempts were not successful prior to 1918.

II

These anti-expansionist Republicans were more effective, for a time at least, during the crisis in American diplomacy that developed around the question of policy toward the Bolshevik Revolution of November, 1917. Led by Senator William E. Borah of Idaho, Senator Hiram Johnson of California, and Raymond Robins (originally a Democrat who supported Theodore Roosevelt in 1912, ran for the Senate as a Progressive in 1914, and joined the Republicans in 1916), this wing of the Republican Party not only opposed President Wilson on the Soviet and related issues, but later clashed with Charles Evans Hughes and Herbert Hoover over questions of foreign affairs. Though achieving some successes in their opposition to armed action in Russia in 1918-1919 and to the later interventionist policies of Hughes and Hoover, the anti-expansionist Republicans were unable to effect a substantial modification of the basic character of American foreign relations prior to the election of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. True, many of the difficulties and dangers against which they warned later materialized, and their main pro-

posals were adopted, at least for a time. But their purpose had been to forestall these difficulties and dangers, and in this they failed.

Robins and his Republican collaborators first sought to strengthen the non-Bolshevik Provisional Government of the March, 1917, Revolution in Russia. Wilson's administration declined effective support for these efforts. Whatever opportunity existed to solve Russia's grave economic and social problems through moderate measures was consequently lost. And when the Bolsheviks seized power, official Washington's policy soon became one of bitter antagonism. Armed intervention was the final—but by no means the only—expression of this opposition.

At the same time, Wilson desired to regain America's old pre-eminence in the economic affairs of Manchuria. Control of the Chinese Eastern Railway was the specific objective in this region. Thus while the basic purpose was to overthrow the Bolsheviks, Wilson's policy took on anti-Chinese and anti-Japanese overtones in its execution.

Robins, Borah, and Johnson quickly pointed out the contradictions and dangers of this course and suggested an alternative. Supported by the recommendations of top American generals, Robins argued that war against the Soviets would be ineffective—even if Congress declared for such action—unless sizable numbers of troops were transferred from the western front, where Germany had yet to be defeated. Wilson's policy, moreover, courted the antagonism of both Russia and China, the two powers that could most effectively help check the ambitions of Japan's military and imperialistic leaders. Nor was Robins unaware that Lenin had revised somewhat the classic Marxist interpretation of world revolution soon after the Bolsheviks were confronted with the responsibilities of power. Far from being ready to initiate a revolutionary crusade, Lenin was primarily concerned with retaining and using the power the Soviets held in Russia. To Robins and Borah, in no sense Bolsheviks, this opened up large vistas of possible economic and political collaboration with Russia.

But Borah, Johnson, and Robins were unable to effect any long-term shift in Wilson's position. Failing there, they organized to end armed intervention in Russia and to defeat Wilson and the Democrats in the elections of 1918 and 1920 over the question of an interventionist foreign policy—not only in Russia but also more generally. Thus the Russian question was the issue over which these so-called "isolationists" first broke with Wilson. Neglect of this central fact has resulted in much confusion. For Borah's opposition to the League of Nations—in which he was joined by Johnson and

other progressive Republicans—was grounded in his harsh criticism of Wilson's policy toward Moscow (the Treaty of Versailles ignored Russia), and the president's expansionist policies in the Far East and Latin America.

And on the identical questions Borah and Robins later waged a long campaign against Hughes and Hoover, leaders of the majority wing of the Republican Party. Armed intervention having failed, Hughes and Hoover pursued a program designed to forestall the consolidation of Soviet power in Russia. Both men predicated future relations on the abandonment of socialist economics. Hoover was explicit in his hope ultimately to establish American economic supremacy in Russia, as elsewhere. Hughes and Hoover were no more "isolationist" than Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft, their Republican predecessors.

Hughes, in fact, conducted more "unofficial" diplomacy than any previous Secretary of State in the nation's history. Unwilling to accept public responsibility for many of his policies, Hughes employed the device of refusing to send fully-accredited delegates to many important international conferences during the 1920s. Behind this camouflage, however, Hughes' representatives engaged in vigorous action during the International Economic Conference at Genoa, the Hague Conference, and at the Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs (1921-22).

In each of these instances (and during the Washington Conference on the Far East, which also met in 1921-22), Hughes either sought to preserve or extend the area and depth of Washington's economic and political intervention in foreign countries. Illustrative of his entire approach was the behind-the-scenes effort in 1922 to make a study of what Hughes termed the Soviet Union's economic "maladies" and to devise "necessary economic remedies"—all without recognition of the Soviet government. Borah and Robins did what they could to oppose this pseudo-isolationism (and its similar implementation in the Caribbean, Central America, and China), but their strength within the Republican Party was never sufficient to defeat Hughes.

Nor were they more potent after Hughes resigned. For as Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover had been a close partner of Hughes in the formulation of American policies prior to 1925, and in subsequent years his influence became ever more apparent. Long a regular pilgrim to the shrine of the export surplus, Hoover did all he could to use the power and prestige of the government to develop existing markets and penetrate new areas on behalf of private individuals and firms. As for the Soviet Union, Hoover's an-

tagonism was never in question. He thought the Soviet's economic system "utter foolishness," and preferred to see Japan extend her authority over China rather than even consider collaboration with Moscow during the Manchurian crisis of 1931.

Borah disagreed vehemently. The Senator went on to underscore the danger to America's future of letting Japan again isolate Russia, as she had successfully done in the years after 1905. Then Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft had ignored Russia's bids for cooperation—only to see Tokyo intimidate St. Petersburg and consolidate her position in South Manchuria. If the same policy was followed once again, Borah warned, the Soviet Union would be forced ultimately to seek security through other arrangements. Tokyo, meanwhile, would continue to nibble away at China. Both Hoover and Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson declined the advice. Borah's bitter comment was witness to the failure of the progressive Republicans to modify the policies of Hughes and Hoover: "I do not think it is possible," he wrote to a friend in January, 1932, "to move things under the present administration. Better to sacrifice the American people than to sacrifice your prejudices."

III

Other Republicans not only shared Hoover's attitude toward Japanese expansion and his hostility to the Soviet Union, but were also disinclined to view the actions of Nazi Germany as either especially dangerous to or disruptive of world peace. One such man was John Foster Dulles. Son of a Protestant missionary who carried the gospel to the Far East, Dulles served his apprenticeship in world affairs under Wilson during World War I. Then, as a leading member of the law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell, he handled important international economic affairs for private firms and other governments. Among his responsibilities in this field were legal representations in behalf of Nazi Germany and General Francisco Franco's Bank of Spain.

After the United States became involved in World War II, however, Dulles supported Senator Arthur Vandenberg in the latter's policy of cooperating with the Roosevelt administration. He became an even more important figure in the Cold War period, during which the administration of President Harry S. Truman found many uses for his undoubted abilities. Most dramatic of these responsibilities was Dulles' role in the negotiation of a peace treaty with Japan. Whether that document was so exclusively the work of Dulles as is generally assumed may be doubted, for it was the Democrats who established the unilateral military occupation upon which the treaty

rested. Despite his importance through these years, however, Dulles never quite buried his conviction that he could run the show better himself.

Disappointed by Thomas Dewey's defeat in 1948, Dulles apparently decided that 1952 might be the last chance to become Secretary of State, as two earlier members of his family had done before him. His resignation as a bipartisan member of the State Department last spring was followed by a flying visit to General Eisenhower in Europe, and a similar exchange of views with Senator Robert Taft. Next came authorship of the Republican foreign-policy plank. Dulles' final touch was an astute refusal to say whether he preferred Eisenhower or Taft until the odds were low enough to gamble, yet high enough to insure a sizable return. And once elected, Eisenhower lost little time in appointing Dulles to the long-sought post of Secretary of State.

Both the powers of that office and his own temperament leave no doubt that Dulles will make a conscious choice between the two legacies of the Republican Party in foreign affairs. His primary interest, he is reported to have told a representative of Eisenhower shortly after the election, is "making policy." (Marquis Childs, November 19.) Considerations beyond his control will limit Dulles' freedom of action, but his ideal is clear enough—the use of refugee-led "task forces" supported by the material, diplomatic, and ideological power of the United States to roll back the area of Soviet influence to some as-yet-undetermined point.

This policy represents a complete reversal of the theory and practice that Dulles offered the public for consideration with reference to Nazi Germany and Japan.

In November, 1938 (two months after the Munich Conference), Dulles published a book entitled *War, Peace and Change*, in which he concluded that wars stem from conflicts between need on the one hand and desire or preference on the other. From early times these conflicts had been solved by the "primitive method" of "force or the threat of force." (p. 7.) Efforts to find a substitute for violence, Dulles continued, have centered around two themes: an ethical solution, which "involves primarily the attainment of a spiritual state conducive to harmony with one's fellows"; and a political solution under which "rules are set up to determine what acts are permissible to gratify desires and what acts must be suppressed." (p. 12.)

Dulles pronounced the ethical approach "in its simple form . . . inadequate to cope with the larger problem of international relations." Satisfactory in the family (or other inter-personal) group, this solution loses effectiveness in situations that are "almost ex-

clusively economic"—and relations among nations, Dulles observed, are "predominantly economic and handled by bodies corporate." (pp. 18, 24.) Another weakness in this approach derives from the fact that ethics take on the characteristics of a formal religion (in the broad sense of the word) when projected beyond national lines. And religions tend to produce "holy" wars, crusades, and persecutions, which, though involving a measure of self-sacrifice by individual participants, nevertheless constitute deplorable manifestations of mass violence." (p. 20.)

Dulles saw little real hope in the political solution, either. As ethics lose potency on the international scene, so too does the technique of exercising political authority fail to adjust and balance the demands for change that become ever more numerous and complex. In the individual countries, according to Dulles, the state tends to be personified as a "nation-hero." But just as with religions, "through dependence upon such artificial stimulation of internal (national) harmony, we engender international disharmony." (p. 35.) History is first distorted to provide the nation-hero with a dramatic opposite—the nation-villain—and then "written and taught in the manner of the dime novel." (p. 58.) Finally, these separately developed religious (or ethical) and political solutions generally merge in the personification of the nation as a "crusading hero, who champions the cause of justice and succors the oppressed"; or as one "who is sensitive of his personal honor and who is quick to strike out in case of actual or seeming affronts." Of the many variations, Dulles concluded, these two "particularly conduce to war." (pp. 65-66.)

Grounded on this theoretical foundation, Dulles' program for peace was of a non-violent character. He saw temporary hope in the fact that government officials, who are important agents in the development of the hero-villain imagery, are not inclined to initiate action—if only out of concern for their own power—under circumstances "which appear to them clearly to be suicidal." (p. 67.) Here a complicating factor was introduced, however, because the so-called villain nation's own concern and fear are "promoted by isolation if the isolation is imposed from without": "No people like to feel that their nation—personified as a hero—is subject to the coercion of others." (pp. 78, 97.)

Another danger, Dulles contended, lurks in the activities of powerful private organizations, even those ostensibly working for peace, that can force a government's hand. As for armaments bringing peace, Dulles dismissed the argument as self-defeating. An arms race, he pointed out, "involves the development to a high degree of the nation-hero nation-villain ideology." (p. 90.) Beyond the fact

that this leads back into the old pattern of solution through force, Dulles rejected the case for armaments on more fundamental grounds: The hero-villain concept "is preponderantly fictitious. The facts rarely warrant it." (p. 110.) Indeed, Dulles wrote, there are "only rarely occasions when those who condemn should not couple their condemnation with repentance, in word and deed, for the causative part played by their own nation." (p. 114.)

For all these reasons, therefore, peace can be preserved only through timely change. "Those who desire the *status quo* must abandon the position that no change should be made until the necessity therefore is demonstrated by the growth of overwhelming pressure. They must abandon this position even at the risk of acquiescing in some change which in retrospect may seem to have been avoidable." (p. 140.)

"'Never' and 'forever,'" Dulles cautioned in conclusion, "are words which should be eliminated from the vocabulary of statesmen."

Considered as abstract theory, what Dulles wrote in 1938 has much to recommend it. Few will quarrel with the thesis that some kinds of change are necessary and inevitable—or that they should be effected as peacefully as possible. But Dulles' purpose was more specific; he was offering to his countrymen an argument in favor of appeasing the Axis powers. It was their aggressions and conquests that were the changes to which it was necessary to make peaceful adjustment.

How little Dulles cared for his theory as such became evident twelve years later when, in a new book entitled *War or Peace* (1950), he addressed himself to the problem of United States policy toward the Soviet Union. In this work, Dulles proposed the exact program he condemned in 1939: the use of force or the threat of force by the nation-hero to achieve complete agreement on unilaterally dictated terms—now, according to Dulles, the prerequisite for even the possibility of peace. Gone is his distaste for the language of the villain imagery; gone also the qualms about oversimplifying history.

The theses of Dulles' two books can be summed up simply: (1) adjust peacefully to Axis expansion, but (2) stop Communism.

Dulles further elaborated his plan for stopping Communism in the spring of 1952 in a widely publicized article in *Life* magazine entitled "A Policy of Boldness." There were no major modifications, but the role of private organizations in Dulles' program became clearer. Already in 1950 he had called for vigorous action by the National Committee for Free Europe; additional reflection had convinced him of the necessity to coordinate private and public action.

When Dulles next offered his program as the foreign policy plank of the Republican Party—after securing the agreement of both Taft and Eisenhower—even the State Department was disturbed. A special representative flew to Chicago, and somewhat calmer counsel prevailed. But only for a time. For as the campaign speeches of both Eisenhower and Dulles soon revealed, the object was still to “liberate” Eastern Europe and, perhaps, even China.* Both men disclaimed, however, any plans that could conceivably provoke catastrophe.

Yet on August 25th, Eisenhower, after referring to Poland as the ancient “bulwark against Tartar savages,” demanded an ultimatum to the Kremlin: “We can never rest” until Russia withdraws from Eastern Europe. “Only then,” continued Eisenhower, would there be even “a possible way of living peacefully and permanently with Communism in the world.” (*New York Times*, August 26, 1952.) Two days later, Dulles gave an extended review of his plan. Liberation, he maintained, was not to be achieved through violent revolution, but rather by “peaceful revolution using such ‘quiet’ methods as passive resistance, non-cooperation, discontent, slowdowns, and industrial sabotage.” Having thus reassured his audience, Dulles provided a preview of things to come. First, Eisenhower’s ultimatum; then the establishment of communications with centers of opposition; and finally, “resistance movements would spring up among patriots, who could be supplied and integrated via air drops and other communications from private organizations like the Committee for a Free Europe.” (*New York Times*, August 28, 1952.)

But no violence.

Eisenhower declared himself amazed by the “false charge” that he would “encourage the use of guns to achieve any goal of our foreign policy.” (*New York Times*, September 23, 1952.) That sounds reassuring, but it is hard to reconcile with the language of the General’s new Secretary of State. “It is, of course, absurd,” Dulles commented on September 3rd, “that General Eisenhower anticipates invoking wholesale insurrection by unarmed slaves. Premature revolt would expose the patriotic people to liquidation.” (*New York Times*, September 4, 1952.) Yet the connotations and implications of Dulles’ words “unarmed” and “premature” cannot but inspire wonder as to what the proposed air drops will contain.

For much as he may want to forget them today, some of the things that Dulles wrote in 1938 will bear up far longer than will his program of 1950. “No people like to feel that their nation—per-

* For Dulles’ views on China, see above, p. 308.—Ed.

sonified as a hero—is subject to the coercion of others.” And the Russians will scarcely look upon an ultimatum followed by organized efforts to promote “resistance groups” as a substitute for the “primitive methods” of “force or the threat of force.”

One may well ask, in these circumstances, what factors are capable of moderating Dulles’ implementation of his program. Certainly, the heirs of the Anti-Imperialist League and the Republican descendants of La Follette and Borah have yet to appear. Senator Taft, writing in *A Foreign Policy For Americans*, manifests considerable concern that the “creation of a condition in which Russia feared the actual invasion of Russia or invasion of some satellite country sufficiently close as to threaten the future invasion of Russia” would provoke World War III. (p. 92.) But Taft’s effective power within the party has yet to be tested—as has the meaning of his statement of general agreement with Dulles.

Nevertheless, circumstances beyond his control may force Dulles to reacknowledge the validity of his 1939 analysis. For men in power, Dulles observed, “are generally disinclined to permit emotion to force action which appears to them clearly to be suicidal.” And “neither voice nor pen,” wrote the new Secretary of State in 1950, “can portray the awful horror of World War III.” Almost without exception, furthermore, leading conservative magazines and newspapers (*U. S. News and World Report* and the *New York Times*, for example) admit that the Soviet Union has not the slightest desire to start World War III.

Awareness of these factors may motivate Dulles to return to his judgment that “conduct and example are more effective, in the long run, than either propaganda or force.” (*War or Peace*, pp. 230-231.) Governments that prove themselves responsive to the needs and desires of their citizens have little to fear from revolutionary ideologies. Nor need they grow disturbed for the vigor of their defenses. Should Dulles return to that more demanding code it would not be the first time that history could be written in terms of irony.

It is a sad commentary that the West may finally—supreme irony!—allow the Soviet bloc to steal the theme of the benefits of commerce and free exchange, just as it has already, through lack of political intelligence, allowed the theme of peace to be carried away.

—*Le Monde*, Paris conservative paper, April 4, 1952

AMERICA AND RUSSIA: A REVIEW AND A COMMENTARY

BY FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN

George Kennan is shocked by "slave labor" camps in Siberia. He therefore decides that it is his "moral duty," and that of the United States of America, to destroy tyranny in Russia. He writes and lectures and helps to found the "Friends of Russian Freedom"—and later seeks to persuade prisoners of war that they do not want to be repatriated but should join the forces of freedom in overthrowing their own government. "Russia," he opines, "is semi-barbarous and medieval."

Raymond Robins tells a group of hostile Senators: "I would never expect, sirs, to suppress the desire for a better human life, no matter how ill-founded in political fact and political experience, with force. The only answer for the desire for a better human life is a better human life."

Are you doubtful about the dates of these utterances? They illustrate the continuity of human affairs, including human folly and human wisdom. The Kennan in question, a kinsman of the recent ex-Ambassador to the Soviet Union, was a foe of the Tsardom half a century ago. He recruited his Russian "revolutionists" among war prisoners in Japan in 1904-05. The Robins in question, now living in retirement in Florida, was head of the American Red Cross mission to Russia in the year of Revolution—and was here endeavoring in vain (despite his being a millionaire and a Republican) to drum some sense about Russia into impenetrable senatorial heads in the grim aftermath of World War I.

These two episodes seem to me to epitomize the tragedy of American policy toward Russia. This drama is much older than the October Revolution. It reflects a persistent ambivalence of attitudes long antedating 1917. Most Americans have long worshipped "freedom"—meaning, commonly, laissez-faire capitalism—and have reacted negatively toward all regimes, regardless of their other qual-

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ities, insufficiently reverential toward laissez-faire capitalism. The Romanov autocracy and the Lenin-Stalin dictatorship were both labelled "tyrannies." Since things equal to the same thing are (supposedly) equal to each other, both have been equally condemned by American pressmen, publicists, and policy-makers, though the Tsardom never elicited such hysteria as has been evoked over 35 years by the Soviet state.

Most "liberals" and many "socialists" would concur in Kennan's judgments of 1900 and in Robins' judgments of 1917-20 by virtue of their own distinctions between Muscovy under the Tsars and Muscovy under the Commissars. But the judgments and the labels are almost irrelevant in the light of broader questions which cut to the core of the world crisis of our time: Should American foreign policy, under the guidance of the "legalistic-moralistic abstractions" against which the new George Kennan has warned, be forever shaped, futilely and to no end save disaster, by a paranoid fear of "the bear that walks like a man" and by a messianic mission to refashion Russia to our heart's desire? Or should it be based upon a pragmatic acceptance of the facts of life, including Soviet socialism, and upon a desire to accommodate American interests to external realities which, however unpleasant, cannot conceivably be changed (save for the worse) by any American wishes or actions?

Such questions are unpopular. They receive almost no attention in our press. They are now sharply posed anew in the most brilliant and informative book of the past two decades on the contacts of the USA and the USSR: William Appleman Williams, *American-Russian Relations, 1781-1947* (Rinehart, 1952, 367 pp., \$5). There have been other sane and useful books—for example, those by Vera M. Dean, H. H. Fisher, Albert Kahn, E. H. Carr, Edward Crankshaw, et al—on various facets of the most crucial problem of our time. All have been widely ignored or lost in the torrents of the literature of defamation, since those most influential in determining American opinion and policy have long been unwilling to face disturbing facts and troublesome issues. But Williams' book is too good to be ignored, as shown by Dexter Perkins' repudiation of its central thesis in *The New York Times Book Review* of November 9, 1952, immediately after publication. The young author is an Iowan and graduate of the United States Naval Academy in 1944. This, his first book—but let us hope not his last—is the outgrowth of his PhD thesis in American History at the University of Wisconsin (1950). He is now Assistant Professor in American Foreign Relations at the University of Oregon. He has written boldly and well. All Americans who still cherish truth are indebted to him and to his publishers, Rinehart &

Co., who know as well as the rest of us that courage is called for in our time to issue works which challenge the Truman-Marshall-Acheson-Dulles-Eisenhower bi-"party line."

So excellent is the Williams volume that one could wish it were better. Since praise is more welcome after blame than blame after praise, let me first cast a few stones, or at least pebbles—without pretending, however, to be without sin—to be followed by some richly deserved bouquets. Dr. Williams' title is misleading on two counts: there is here no serious treatment of Russian policy toward America but only of American policy toward Russia; and, despite the dates, only 50 pages, though admirable ones, are devoted to the years before 1917, and only 25 to events since 1939. Within the limits of his enterprise, moreover, Williams has, I believe, done an injustice to my old teacher, the late Samuel N. Harper, who, for all his confusions in 1918-20, did try to talk sense about Russia in later years. Williams has located "Ham" Fish in Massachusetts, an error which I must indignantly repudiate. He has ignored Congress, public opinion, and the press in the intervention period and thereafter, though what was said and done at these levels was fantastic, fascinating, and revealing.

Despite his meticulous documentation, Williams has so condensed his tale as to omit a number of important matters: the delicious episode of Edgar Sisson, on behalf of the Government of the United States, paying money to Raymond Robins in December, 1917, to help finance Bolshevik revolutionary propaganda in Germany; the Martens mission of 1919, wherein the Soviet Ambassador-designate to the United States was arrested and deported by the redbaiters; the Paderewski proposal to the Paris Peace Conference to lead a Polish army to the conquest of Moscow and the destruction of Bolshevism; the refusal of Washington to recognize the Baltic States, 1917-22, in the name of preserving the "territorial integrity of Russia"; the military facts (without which the political facts are meaningless) of both World Wars, the Russian civil war, the Polish war, and the Rumanian war against Hungary in 1919; the adventures of the Czechoslovak Legion, which precipitated civil strife and intervention in Russia in 1918—here relegated to one paragraph; the Colby Note of August 10, 1920, barely mentioned by Williams (p. 173), though it laid the bases of United States policy for the next 13 years; the facts and the law of the problems of debts, claims, and propaganda in the 1920's and 1930's; and so on.

Is this scholar's quibbling? I think not. Who writes of American-Russian relations without discussing these events has overlooked important parts of the story. And there is missing from Williams' other-

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wise detailed bibliography an early book which, if used, would have corrected some of his errors of commission and omission. Yes (you guessed it), another PhD thesis, University of Chicago, entitled *American Policy Toward Russia Since 1917*, and published as a book in 1928 by Martin Lawrence of London and International Publishers (because no other American publisher would publish it) of New York. Modesty forbids me to reveal the author.

So much said, I hasten to reiterate, without hyperbole, that this is the most revealing book of our generation on the most important problem of our time. Williams has done meticulous research in the National Archives; in the archives of the Red Cross; in the papers of Ray Stannard Baker, Tasker Bliss, Borah, Burleson, Coolidge, Creel, Hoover, Judson, Lansing, Robins, Kennan (both), Roosevelt (both), and others. He interviewed many of the surviving actors. He has mastered an astounding quantity of other source materials and commentaries. He has ordered his data magnificently, presented it in readable style, and dared to draw from it general conclusions and interpretations which, I am confident, will stand the test of time.

Since summary is impossible, samples must suffice to suggest the quality of the whole. Here is the story of Brooks Adams at the turn of the century preaching American imperialism in Asia at the expense of Russia and China; here is the earlier George Kennan deciding that the Japanese are "Aryans" entitled to take Korea and "civilize" China and Russia; here is Teddy Roosevelt finding no support for his anti-Russian policy until Tsarist pogroms evoke Jewish and Christian indignation; here are the rivalries and bargains of the House of Morgan, Edward H. Harriman, and Kuhn, Loeb & Co. for control of the railways of Manchuria; here is Elihu Root's absurd "mission" to Russia in mid-year of 1917 and the emergence of the "containment" (that is, destruction) policy not in 1947 but in 1918; here is the best account yet of United States support in December, 1917, to Kaledin, Alexeev, and Denikin in their ill-fated attempt to overthrow the Soviets; here is the pathos of Wilson:

President Woodrow Wilson's deep desire so to order the affairs of the world that individual men would never again organize themselves for the planned creation of chaos is a matter of record. But despite his total commitment—physical as well as intellectual—to that effort, the scattered shambles of Berlin, London's East Side, Stalingrad, Manila, and Hiroshima were to document the discrepancy between Wilson's desire and its fulfillment. Yet that difference cannot be satisfactorily explained by references to a group of "willful men," the inadequacy of the plan, the vengeance of the victor, the vindictiveness of the vanquished, or even the petulance of the President himself.

To be sure, those considerations were important; but as a few men have hinted, and as the record verifies, the critical factor at Paris was the Russian problem. . . . The essential tragedy of Wilson's failure lies in the fact that he realized and acknowledged that the Soviets represented a desperate attempt on the part of the dispossessed to share the bounty of industrial civilization. More, he knew they must be given access to that share if further resort to violence was to be forestalled. Yet this keen insight was first dimmed then ultimately beclouded by antagonism to the Soviets and the conscious desire to expand American influence abroad. (pp. 157-159.)

These exciting and explosive pages recount much else in fully documented detail: the transmutation of William Christian Bullitt from a disciple of sanity to an apostle of Holy War against Red Sin; Senator Borah working for recognition and realizing that in the eyes of official policy-makers "our peace is nothing but war carried on in a different way"; Robert Kelley, State Department "expert," influencing policy under Coolidge, Hoover, and Roosevelt alike; Rear Admiral Yates Sterling, Jr., calling in 1935 for American support of Hitler in a "great crusade" to annihilate Communism; the "Long, Lean Years" of obfuscation; "The Tragedy of the Thirties," with Washington rejecting every effort of Moscow to establish a common front against German and Japanese fascist aggression; and "The Sophistry of Super-Realism"—an acute and devastating account of Truman's repudiation of FDR's conception of American-Russian relations in favor of "Cold War"; and an unanswerable demonstration of the futility, unworkability, and potential catastrophe of the current American response to the challenge of Soviet Communism.

Williams is at his best in dissecting the roles of professional civil servants and business interests in shaping American policies. Yet this is no "bureaucratic" or "managerial" interpretation, nor yet a new species of "economic determinism." His concluding paragraph (p. 283), referring to the present George Kennan, is indicative of both the weakness and wisdom of this invaluable piece of historical research:

Freedom is not nurtured by states preparing for war. Rather does it find more opportunity to flower in the atmosphere of mutual accommodation achieved and sustained through negotiated settlements. Here is the heart of Kennan's greatest failure—for his policy would, in fact, prove Marx to have been right. To "create among the peoples of the world generally," in Kennan's words, "the impression of a country which knows what it wants, which is coping successfully with the problems of its internal life and with the responsibilities of a World Power"—

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to do this the United States must demonstrate the courage to acknowledge the broad challenge of the Bolshevik Revolution, face its implications, and embark upon a conscious effort to prove Marx's *predictions* to have been in error. One must conclude, however, that Kennan and those who follow the course he charted were unaware of the challenge—and until that issue was faced candidly no effective response would be formulated to the challenge of Soviet power.

American policy toward Russia, I am disposed to believe, is not, and has never been, intelligible in terms of any of the more popular frames of reference—*Realpolitik*, "capitalist plots," "crusades for freedom," "Wall Street Imperialism," Red Conspiracies, legalism, moralism, or even sheer stupidity. Williams plays up American efforts to destroy Communism and plays down Soviet efforts to destroy capitalism. But the central question he does not attempt to answer, though he supplies much of the evidence needed for an answer. It is this: Why have Americans made the USSR their *bête noire* or Devil—and, having done so for more than a third of a century (with deceptive interludes in 1933 and in 1941-45), why have they so dealt with the Devil as constantly to enhance his power to resist them and constantly to reduce their own capacity to destroy him or even to come to terms with him?

The question, I submit, is fairly put. America in 1918 undertook to destroy the Soviet regime by force and, in so doing, strengthened it and helped to make it "totalitarian." America in the 1920's sought to undermine the Soviet regime by non-recognition and achieved nothing whatever thereby. America in the 1930's found no way of cooperating with the USSR against the common menace of fascism. America in the 1940's waged a victorious war in alliance with the USSR and then broke with its allies. Williams shows, incontrovertibly, where responsibility for the break must be placed.

Communism thrives on war, though the world wars of our century are never launched by Communists but by anti-Communists in the name of destroying Communism. Americans did nothing effective or even relevant toward averting World Wars I and II. Americans "won" both wars only because millions of Russians gave their lives in a common cause. But Americans respond with fear and fury to the inevitable expansion of Communism which war engenders and, as regards many of the "statesmen" of the Republic, seek madly to undo the result through more war. For some, at least, of the winners of the election of 1952, as well as for some of the losers, it is now America's Sacred Mission to resume the anti-Russian "crusade" which brought Napoleon, the Kaiser, and Hitler to their doom. All

the ghastly errors of judgment and policy manifested in the original American response to Red Russia have been reproduced, almost verbatim, in American policy toward Red China, thereby suggesting the possible validity of Hegel's dictum that "the only lesson which history teaches is that history teaches no lessons."

The answer to the question, I suspect, is that a community, even though it be the Greatest Power on Earth, which has found no viable and enduring solution to its internal economic and social cleavages inevitably seeks to achieve unity and prosperity by mobilizing the energies of its people against an "enemy" symbol which threatens its values. This political device is common to democratic, fascist, and Communist states. But distinctions are in order. A fascist state in a highly industrialized capitalist society has no choice but to unleash war abroad as a means to "peace" at home. A Communist state is under no such compulsion, since socialist economic planning, whatever its administrative defects and human costs, admits of internal stability and plenty without the need of militarism and conquest. A democratic state within a capitalist economy—for example, the USA—should, theoretically, be able to do as well or better. But Americans have found it easier to take the primrose path to full employment and economic expansion through militarism in the name of "defense" against "tyranny."

Pessimists may conclude that the dynamics of this process make World War III "inevitable." This conclusion I reject for two reasons: (1) No victory is possible in any such enterprise, since the new enemy, unlike his counterparts in World Wars I and II, controls effectively one-third of the human race—and policy-makers, unless they are insane, never embark upon wars in which victory is obviously unattainable. (2) American common sense, which has an astonishing way of reasserting itself when least expected, will ultimately perceive that the "Red Menace," both at home and abroad, is largely a racket and a fraud, and will find means to maintain full employment and prosperity by methods other than those of global atomic hostilities or even of local "perpetual war for perpetual peace," as the late Charles A. Beard characterized the delusion of "collective security."

Thus far, on the record as Williams' book brilliantly reviews it, America has failed what Woodrow Wilson in 1918 called "the acid test." But America can take the test again and conceivably pass—by making peace with Russia and with China, not on their terms or our terms, since neither side has defeated or can defeat the other, but on terms of compromise and mutual accommodation, leading toward collaboration in building the world order of days to come

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which all men must have in our time if the Great Society is to survive and flourish. Not to do so will be to court the incineration of western civilization. To do so will be to open out vast opportunities for peaceful progress for all the peoples of the world. William Appleman Williams has made a major contribution toward the only solution which sane human beings can accept. For this: our thanks.

As a service to those readers who may want to secure a copy of this new and important book, reviewed here by Professor Schuman, MR will take orders and fill them promptly.

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Please send copies of *American-Russian Relations 1781-1947* by William Appleman Williams at the publisher's price of \$5 per copy to

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What is the new loyalty? It is, above all, conformity. It is the uncritical and unquestionable acceptance of America as it is—the political institutions, the social relationships, the economic practices. It rejects inquiry into the race question or socialized medicine, or public housing, or into the wisdom or validity of our foreign policy. It regards as heinous any challenge to what is called "The system of private enterprise," identifying that system with Americanism. It abandons evolution, repudiates the once popular concept of progress, and regards America as a finished product, perfect and complete.

—Henry Steele Commager, *Harper's Magazine*, September, 1947

(continued from inside front cover)

trust that no general significance attaches to these figures, and that when the final returns are in, this year's results will surpass last year's by a generous margin. But whether or not that turns out to be the case depends entirely on you. If you approve of our policy of expanding and adding new features, please tell us so in the most practical way possible—by joining MRA and contributing as much as you can possibly afford.

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While on the subject of financial support for MR, let us add that other organs of the Left press also need and deserve your help. Right now, this applies particularly to *National Guardian* (17 Murray Street, New York 7, N. Y.)—whatever you can spare, whether \$2 for a year's sub or any sum at all as a contribution, will be money well spent.

Murray Zuckerman of 6253 Booth Street, Rego Park, Long Island, would like to start a discussion group on international affairs and asks any interested MR readers in his neighborhood to get in touch with him directly.

Letter of the month: "I just finished reading the back issues of MR which were issued before I became a subscriber, and was deeply impressed by your editorials at the time of the outbreak of the Korean War. It is easy now to see how correct you were, but two years ago at a time of general confusion, even in the progressive camp, it was an admirable job. I was very glad to hear of the magazine's remarkable growth and hope you will be able to continue to expand."

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